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Structural changes in industrial R&D in Europe 
and the US: towards a new model?  
Dominique Foray and Stéphane Lhuillery 
We analyse the structural changes that have characterised the organisation of industrial R&D over the 
last 25 years. Taking Mowery’s work (Industrial and Corporate Change, 2009, 18(1), 1–50) on the US 
as a starting point, we reconsider the different aspects of structural change he examined, discuss their 
impact and the overall logic underlying them. We then examine Europe to discover to what extent 
these structural changes have occurred in recent years. While a certain structural evolution is 
perceptible, it is not on the same scale as that analysed for the US. Finally, we consider the extent to 
which the new structures are more or less ‘efficient’ than previous ones. We conclude with the 
implications for R&D and innovation policy implications. 
HIS PAPER ANALYSES THE structural 
changes that have characterised the organisa-
tion of industrial R&D over the last 25 years. 
Taking Mowery’s work (2009) concerning the case 
of the US as a starting point, we reconsider the dif-
ferent aspects of structural change examined by him, 
discuss their impact and attempt to bring to light the 
overall logic of these transformations. According to 
Mowery, the fundamental reorganisation of R&D, as 
developed during the last 30 years in the US, is par-
ticularly characterised by more complex forms of 
industrial structures (vertical disintegration) in 
which a new sector occupies an important place 
(firms specialising in R&D and innovation ‘ser-
vices’) and by the larger role played by market 
transactions in the coordination of innovative activi-
ties. The intensive use of intellectual property (IP) 
and licence agreements is the logical completion of 
this development, something that is occurring espe-
cially in the new high-tech industries.  
We then examine the case of Europe to discover 
to what extent these same structural changes have 
occurred. While a certain structural evolution is per-
ceptible, it is not on the same scale as that analysed 
for the US. We try to understand why this is so by 
identifying the effects of industrial specialisation in 
particular. Europe’s difficulty in achieving a leading 
position in the new high-tech industries is closely 
linked with the weakness of structural change, al-
though the direction of causality is obviously diffi-
cult to determine. 
Finally, we ask ourselves to what extent the new 
structures are more or less ‘efficient’ than previous 
ones. In this respect we note that these new structures, 
in which the technology market is a powerful incen-
tive mechanism facilitating the coordination of activi-
ties, still have significant inefficiencies, which in 
actual fact stem from the functioning of this market. 
We conclude with R&D and innovation policy impli-
cations, which in our opinion logically derive from 
this analysis, in general and for Europe in particular. 
Structural changes in industrial R&D in the 
US: 1980–2005 
The structural changes that industrial R&D has un-
dergone over the last 25 years are considerable. We 
draw heavily on Mowery’s work to identify the main 
aspects of these changes. We then try to identify some 
coherence, an economic logic, in these changes. 
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Toward a new landscape 
In a carefully documented paper, Mowery (2009) 
demonstrates that by the early 21st century, the land-
scape of US industrial R&D has totally changed  
in relation to its structure 30 years earlier.1 The fol-
lowing aspects deserve some consideration. 
The science-based entrepreneurial dynamic The 
‘third industrial revolution’ (Mowery, 1995) driven 
by information and communications technologies 
(ICT) and biotechnology is characterised by the en-
try of new firms into emerging markets. These firms 
are small, R&D-intensive and service oriented. 
A first insight into this evolution is provided  
by the entrepreneurial phenomenon which brought 
about important structural change, altering the roles 
of large and small firms as R&D performers: the 
proportion of industry-funded R&D investment car-
ried out by very large firms (over 25,000 employees) 
dropped from 60% in 1984 to less than 32% by 2007 
(Wolfe, 2009). Firms with less than 500 employees 
(small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)) in-
creased their share of R&D performance from 6% in 
1984 to 19% in 2007 (Wolfe, 2009). Moreover, the 
figures for micro-firms are certainly downward bi-
ased by the difficulties involved in measuring R&D 
activities carried out by early-stage companies. 
The entry of new firms is especially associated 
with increasing specialisation in inventive activity. 
These new firms are specialised in narrow segments 
of the industry value chain, segments that are often 
placed in the upstream phase of the innovation pro-
cess. As a result, industry structures become some-
what unusual and much more complicated as they 
accommodate ‘industries’ intermediate between pub-
lic research and large companies. For instance, by the 
mid-1990s, several thousand biotechnology ventures 
had been launched and several had survived and 
reached a sufficient size to constitute an important 
force in the industry (Cockburn, 2003). Existing ver-
tical relationships were disrupted and reformed. Pat-
enting and licensing played a critical role in the 
establishment of these new vertically disintegrated 
structures (see below). 
This entrepreneurial activity fosters the growth of 
high added-value services and the related increase  
of R&D investments in these sectors: non-
manufacturing R&D investment increased from 5% 
of total company R&D investment in 1990 to nearly 
30% by 2007. Even if the data may reflect a reclassi-
fication of a few large US firms from the manufac-
turing to the non-manufacturing category during the 
period (Shackelford, 2007), they show that the 
growth of non-manufacturing R&D reflects the ex-
pansion of market-oriented knowledge-intensive 
services (see Table 1) and the importance of R&D 
expenditures in information activities or profes-
sional, scientific and technical services.2 
A more collaborative R&D The increase in inter-
firm R&D and technology-based alliances occurred 
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Table 1. Global gross revenue (in US$ trillions at 2000 prices) of market-oriented knowledge-intensive and other service 
industries in the US, 1986–2005 
Industry 1986 1995 2000 2005 Average annual
growth (%) 
All service industries 20.24 27.52 33.06 38.49 3.3 
    Market-oriented knowledge-intensive services  4.54 6.86 9.44 11.52 4.8 
    Service industries not classified as market-oriented knowledge-intensive 15.71 20.66 23.62 26.67 2.7 
Market-oriented knowledge-intensive share of all services (%) 22.4 24.9 28.6 29.9 n/a 
Notes: n/a  not applicable  
Knowledge-intensive services classified by the OECD and consisting of business, financial, communications, education, and 
health services. Market-oriented knowledge-intensive services exclude education and health services. Gross revenue includes 
purchases of domestic and imported materials and inputs 
Source:  Global Insight, Inc., World Industry Service database, special tabulations in NSF (2008) 
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partly due to the entry of vertically specialised firms. 
The R&D survey data underlines the surge of extra-
mural R&D expenditures by firms during the period 
1993–2003 (National Science Foundation (NSF), 
2006), whereas the data provided by the Cooperative 
Agreements and Technology Indicators (CATI-
MERIT) show a clear trend of increasing alliances 
between firms (NSF, 2006) at the national but also 
the international level.  
The number of R&D alliances between US and 
non-US firms rose sharply during the period 1980–
2003, showing that the R&D activity of US firms is 
becoming more globalised; however, more than half 
of these collaborations remain intra-US. Although 
information concerning rates of dissolution and also 
the average size of these alliances is lacking, these 
figures remain striking. They also indicate that this 
phenomenon particularly characterised the R&D-
intensive sectors, especially biotechnology and ICT. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, US alliances were 
primarily entered into by ICT firms. ICT alliances 
stagnated after the internet bubble burst whereas 
those in biotechnology were still growing (Table 2). 
Another interesting feature is the significant growth 
in the share of contract-based alliances (e.g. licens-
ing, shared resources and competencies) versus eq-
uity-based alliances (e.g. partial acquisitions or joint 
ventures) (see NSF, 2006).  
To conclude the presentation of this first round of 
evidence, empirical observation emphasises the de-
velopment of an industry structure populated by 
firms that specialise in somewhat narrow activities 
and who contract with other firms that specialise in 
different activities within the industry. In such a new 
structure, innovation relies heavily on a complex 
web of contracts linking a variety of actors at vari-
ous stages. 
The growing role of patents in industry and univer-
sity These structural changes (notably the vertical 
disintegration of industries and the emergence and 
surge of a science-based entrepreneurial dynamic) 
are closely associated with the increasing impor-
tance of patenting and licensing. 
Many events, involving key institutional changes 
(Jaffe, 2000) as well as certain critical court deci-
sions, have created the so-called pro-patent era in the 
US, which is characterised by a considerable rise in 
patent applications since 1984. This growth has 
placed a tremendous strain on patent offices. Since 
grant rates remain stable, the annual number of pat-
ents granted has increased dramatically. New subject 
matters, the increasing complexity of patents (as 
measured by the number of claims), strategic use, a 
growing number of patents dealing with scientific 
information and tools as well as the increasing like-
lihood of litigation are other aspects of this evolu-
tion. Such a sharp increase is largely attributable to 
filings from business firms and institutional inven-
tors residing in the US and is concentrated in a few 
sectors (Hall, 2004). This pro-patent environment 
has probably strengthened IP markets, leading to an 
increase in licensing transactions and facilitating the 
financing and entry of new firms who possess a 
small number of valuable patents. 
Finally, the growth in university patenting/ 
licensing has attracted a lot of attention from aca-
demics and policy-makers and is usually associated 
with the Bayh–Dole Act (1980) that allowed per-
formers of publicly funded research to file for pat-
ents and grant exclusive licenses. Universities 
increased their share of patenting from less than 2% 
in the 1980s to 4.8% by 1999, although this share 
had already begun to grow before the Bayh–Dole 
Act. The new law therefore provides only a partial 
explanation and was in a sense more an endogenous 
response to the patenting and licensing increase that 
had already begun rather than an exogenous cause. 
Some other factors, such as the more general pro-
patent environment as well as the dramatic increase 
in the federal budget for biomedical research, played 
a central role. Since 1999, however, the share of col-
lege and university patenting as a percentage of US 
non-governmental patents decreased to 4.2% in 
2005, showing that academics have not succeeded in 
following the rhythm of industry. Since 2005, the 
number of academic patents granted has decreased 
despite an increase in invention disclosures and  
Table 2. Technology alliances at triadic level, by technological fields, in period 1980–2003
Field  Biotech ICT Other 
Period  1980–1987 1988–1995 1996–2003 1980–1987 1988–1995 1996–2003 1980–1987 1988–1995 1996–2003
Intra-Europe  17% 16% 16% 21% 9% 8% 23% 21% 18% 
USA–Europe  24% 37% 34% 23% 23% 25% 22% 30% 33% 
Intra-USA  33% 37% 42% 28% 50% 47% 16% 29% 34% 
USA–Japan  15% 6% 6% 16% 13% 11% 15% 11% 6% 
Intra-Japan  8% 1% 1% 6% 2% 5% 14% 4% 3% 
Europe–Japan  3% 3% 2% 7% 4% 4% 10% 6% 5% 
Other zones  6% 10% 14% 7% 10% 20% 13% 21% 17% 
Total  522 722 1715 867 1580 1393 699 1035 866 
Source:  Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators (CATI-MERIT). Data from the Science and Engineering Indicators (NSF 
2006). Calculations made by the authors. Note that some alliances are classified in several categories simultaneously. ‘Other’ is 
the sum of aerospace/defence, car and chemical industries. Possible double counting is not taken into account 
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royalty payments (see NSF, 2008: Appendix Tables 
5-40 and 5-42). 
Is there any underlying economic logic? 
Is there any economic sense behind these rather dif-
ferent structural changes? Is there a puzzle with these 
various aspects forming the different pieces that, 
once assembled, will provide a meaningful picture? 
To recapitulate, we have observed that the growth of 
small (new) firms and the declining importance of 
large firms as R&D performers are both associated 
in a complex way with increasing vertical specialisa-
tion, involving the creation of highly focused seg-
ments in the upstream phases of the innovation 
process. The growth of contract-based alliances and 
the considerable increase in patenting and licensing 
(in general and from academia) also constitute im-
portant parts of this picture. All of these trends oc-
curred mostly in a few new high-tech industries.  
Since the various dimensions documented above 
are critically interdependent they may at times exhibit 
complementarities. The pro-patent environment is 
strengthening IP markets, facilitating the signalling, 
financing and entry of new firms and leading to an in-
crease in licensing and other knowledge dissemina-
tion activities (Lhuillery, 2006). Such an IP market 
also supports the development of vertical specialisa-
tion since firms are able to specialise and license their 
results to other firms. Partly because of the entry of 
vertically specialised firms, extramural R&D expen-
ditures as well as R&D alliances have grown and 
strong IP may facilitate greater reliance on contractual 
rather than equity-based governance.3 Finally, univer-
sities contribute to both the market for technologies 
and the entry of new science-based entrepreneurs.  
Chesbrough (2003), among others, argues that the 
high-tech firms must nowadays collaborate more  
with external direct or indirect partners in order to 
achieve better innovative performances. However, 
this ‘openness’ strategy is not new and was already 
applied by firms in the decades from 1880 to the 
1920s according to Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) 
and was successfully used as a strategy by some com-
panies in the 1980s (Barabaschi, 1992). A further step 
is to understand the mechanisms underpinning this 
evolution. Mowery (2009) rightly argues that the pro-
found economic sense which best captures the es-
sence of the different structural changes documented 
might be found in the ‘greater reliance on market re-
lationships for the governance of the R&D and inno-
vation process’, mirroring a decrease in transaction 
costs (Arora et al., 2001; Mowery, 2009).  
Europe: structural changes are under way, 
but at a more modest pace 
The familiar picture about R&D in Europe is that EU 
firms still remain significantly less R&D-intensive 
than their US counterparts. Current explanations of 
this feature involve two arguments: first, the EU is 
not specialised into high-tech sectors and is more 
specialised into the less R&D-intensive services sec-
tors. Secondly, the high-tech industry and high-tech 
services are more R&D intensive in the US (Euro-
pean Commission, 2008). Despite important efforts 
to gather and harmonise data sets (EUKLEMS, 
2009), R&D data are still missing at the sectoral 
level (Arundel et al., 2007), hampering a detailed 
comparison between the EU and the US. The caveat 
particularly concerns the growing business services 
and especially knowledge-intensive business ser-
vices (KIBS). In the following paragraphs, we will 
first highlight some differences between the EU and 
the US based on available patent and R&D data and 
offer an interpretation of these trends. We then ad-
vocate that the structural evolution of the EU system 
is also slower due to the influence of policies: the 
US system is more prone to support the emergence 
of new activities. 
Europe’s path towards structural changes in  
industrial R&D 
We first contend that the structural changes occur in 
Europe at a more modest pace (see also Gambardella 
et al., 2007). Despite the lack of relevant data, we 
articulate three statistical features. First, we show 
that Europe has not profoundly changed its knowl-
edge base (i.e. its specialisation structure) and exhib-
its a much lower development of new high-tech 
activities. A second feature is that Europe failed to 
create as much as knowledge in business services as 
the US did. Finally, we suggest that Europe has 
maintained a quite traditional model of transferring 
academic knowledge and information whereas the 
new R&D organisation in the US involves a new 
model of technology transfer between universities 
and industries (where the new high-tech service 
firms play the central role of knowledge brokers). 
First, the variation in the ability of countries to 
transform their specialisation and develop new ac-
tivities is an important element of the explanation 
for the differences in the rate and magnitude of 
structural changes between the US and Europe since 
most structural changes (increasing role of small 
firms as R&D performers, vertical disintegration of 
 
Variation in the ability of countries to 
transform their specialisation and 
develop new activities is an important 
element in the differences in the rate 
and magnitude of structural changes 
between the US and Europe 
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industries, growth of alliances, R&D internationali-
sation, growth of patenting and licensing) have 
mainly occurred in a set of new industries and ser-
vices. The very fact that Europe has indeed failed to 
develop these new activities is clearly demonstrated 
in Figure 1, based on triadic patents. 
Figure 1 shows how countries changed (or main-
tained) their technological specialisations during the 
two last decades of the 20th century. The trend to-
ward the north and north-east quadrants shows a 
higher weight of new industries (ICT and biomedical 
fields). Hence, Canada, Finland, France, Sweden, 
the UK, and US were less and less specialised in the 
vehicle or organic chemistry industries and more and 
more in computer technologies and ICT over time. 
The length of the segments shows how profound 
these changes were. Figure 1 underlines that Canada, 
France, Sweden and the UK moved their specialisa-
tion over time but not sufficiently to build a new 
one. On the contrary, the US and Finland, as well as 
Denmark, Germany or Japan are clearly more spe-
cialised and maintain or reinforce their specialisation 
over time. Finland is the only one of the 15 member 
states of the EU before May 2004 (EU-15) that suc-
ceeded in embarking on the ICT revolution to a  
sufficient degree to transform the change into a clear 
specialisation. Correspondingly, Denmark is the only 
EU-15 country clearly specialised in agro-bio-
pharma technologies. Thus, the US is the only large 
country that has succeeded in building a clear spe-
cialisation in the new fields over the last 20 years, 
whereas Germany and Japan remain in the same 
technology segments. Despite some changes and 
some specialised countries, the members of the EU-
15 as a whole remain specialised in the automotive 
industry, organic chemistry, mechanical engineering 
and textiles over the period reflecting the traditional 
specialisations of countries like Germany, Austria, It-
aly and Switzerland. Figure 1 confirms the leadership 
 
The US is the only large country that 
has succeeded in building a clear 
specialisation in the new fields over 
the last 20 years 
Figure 1.  Evolving structure of national triadic patent portfolios, 1991–2000 versus 1981–1990 
Notes:   ?1990s = 1991–2000, ? 1980s = 1981–1990 
 EU is EU-15, Others are other OECD countries 
First two axes explain 66% of variance in our component factor analysis. Axes are computed on 1990s period using 
the different countries. The EU90s value is not taken into account in the computation of the axes as well as the 1980s 
plots: they are projected afterwards to give an idea of the structural evolution over the two periods. The arrows thus 
depict the changing profiles in knowledge production in a country according to two axes. The horizontal axis 
opposes for example a specialisation in microelectronics to a specialisation in the agro-food technologies; the 
vertical axis, opposes ICT to vehicle industries. The more central the country is, the less specialised it is  
Source:  Data taken from OECD triadic patents. Available at <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=PATS_ 
IPC>, last accessed 16 June 2010 
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of the US in the third industrial revolution. It also 
confirms that Europe, with few exceptions, is lag-
ging behind in these technologies and remains stuck 
in its ‘old’ knowledge specialisations.  
The evolution displayed in Figure 1 tells only one 
part of the story: the ability of countries to transform 
their specialisations is the key to explaining the im-
portance and magnitude of structural changes in R&D. 
However, Figure 1 does not capture the structural 
changes themselves: what is happening within sec-
tors with regard to corporate R&D? And the second 
part of the story, already discussed in the introduc-
tion to this paper, also makes a distinction between 
the US and Europe, which is the evolution of coun-
tries towards a high-value service economy where 
R&D firms and other specialised innovation services 
are competing and trading with universities and the 
industrial R&D laboratories of large companies to 
produce and develop technological knowledge.  
Secondly, the EU did not succeed in creating 
these new segments in the upstream phases of the 
innovation process in the ICT and biotechnology in-
dustries. Figure 2 shows that the transformation of 
industry in this respect was much greater and faster 
in the US than in the EU. The US transformation in-
volved a significant increase in specialised R&D 
producers classified as belonging to the service in-
dustries.4 While the EU is keeping pace with the US 
with regard to industrial R&D, it has failed to create 
an equivalent entrepreneurial R&D and high-tech 
fringe in R&D and innovation services that are im-
portant complementary assets for competitive inno-
vation (Passi, 1999). 
The European difficulties or delay at creating 
these complementary activities (Passi, 1999;  
Castaldi, 2009) have a direct impact on growth: 
whereas the new high-tech services or more pre-
cisely the so-called KIBS are boosting productivity 
in the US, they are possibly a hampering factor for 
productivity growth in Europe (Castaldi, 2009).  
Thirdly, we compare the share of higher educa-
tion funded by industry in Europe and the United 
States. Figure 3 actually shows some similarities 
between the US and EU: like their US counterparts, 
EU firms have been significantly involved since the 
end of the 1980s in university funding. However, 
the evolution of US academic funding since 1999 
shows a considerable difference between the two 
regions. Whereas in the US, firms have decreased 
their financial support, there is no such tendency in 
the case of the EU where universities represent a 
growing part of extramural business R&D expendi-
tures. One possible interpretation (among several, 
not mutually exclusive) is that in the US, new 
R&D performers (start-ups, services) entered mas-
sively, as a result of the structural changes already 
documented, and captured a growing share of in-
dustrial and even federal funding. For example, the 
US National Institutes of Health (NIH), which have 
benefited from the main increases in federal R&D 
funding over the last ten years, spent more than 
twice the 2000 amounts in 2007 (US$2.0 billion) 
with industrial firms. The share of firms in external 
contracts grew from 4% to 10% over the period 
(NIH, 2008).  
Figure 3 shows that the evolution was not the 
same for Europe. This might be interpreted in terms 
of the continuing dominance of the ‘old structure’ 
with not so many new actors trying to share the 
cake. 
Figure 2.  Business R&D levels by sectors, in US$ million (at 2000 prices) 
Source:  Data taken from OECD (2007) 
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The influence of policies 
One factor that certainly explains the difference be-
tween the importance and magnitude of structural 
changes in corporate R&D in the US and the EU 
concerns the centrality of governmental R&D policy 
in the US as a driver of these structural changes. We 
distinguish four policy areas that have clearly im-
pacted the whole process: government S&T policies, 
market regulations, intellectual property rights (IPR) 
rules, and financial regulations. 
First, government R&D spending must be consid-
ered (Dinges et al., 2007). In this respect, some as-
pects of the structural changes in the US are clearly 
related to the federal funding shift from defence-
related to biomedical fields (Rosenberg, 2009). Fig-
ure 4 shows trends in funding of the two main gov-
ernment budget appropriations or outlays for R&D 
(GBAORD), which are health and environment 
(H&E) and defence R&D (defence) spending. It 
suggests that any fluctuation in US federal spending 
which involves reallocation across fields, is likely to 
have a huge impact on R&D activities (entry and 
exit, reorganisation) simply because the amounts 
spent are huge. So new priorities in biomedical re-
search or ICT, as translated into federal R&D budget 
reallocation, are likely to drive the evolution men-
tioned above — the growth of new types of R&D 
firms specialised in narrow upstream segments of 
the biomedical or ICT industries. While the gap be-
tween the US and EU narrowed a little during the 
1990s, the remaining difference (increasing again 
since 2003) represents a very large amount (roughly 
US$4 billion in current purchasing power parity). 
The share of H&E in civil GBOARD increased from 
35% in the US to 59% over the last 20 years whereas 
the increase at the European level was only from 
13% to 19% over the period (see Figure 5). 
The early reallocation of the European Commis-
sion funding over the period is remarkable but re-
mains too small to significantly influence the 
transformation of the European system. The evolu-
tion depicted in Figure 4 combined with the evolu-
tion of the GBOARD structure in Figure 5 suggests 
the remarkable ability of the US system to shift re-
sources and research capabilities to more productive 
use whenever possible; such an ability being a criti-
cal determinant of success.  
Secondly, economic and regulatory policies also 
play a role. On antitrust policy, successive US ad-
ministrations reduced the power of antitrust restric-
tions on R&D collaboration. US antitrust policy has 
also played a strong role in facilitating the vertical 
disintegration of new industries and the competitive 
entry of new firms. As shown in many recent re-
ports, despite a similar permissive regulation on 
R&D cooperation, competition policy in Europe has 
historically emphasised competition between in-
cumbent firms, but paid little attention to entry 
(Sapir et al., 2004; Aghion, 2006). For example, the 
EU or European national administrations did not pay 
much attention to the regulation of the market for 
R&D services and accepted the competitive entry of 
academic bodies without considering the possible 
negative impact of it on the innovation system.  
Thirdly, another important focal point regarding 
policy involves changes in and adaptation of the pat-
ent and other IPR systems so that new fields were 
opened to patentability, a more effective legal sys-
tem was set up and new guests (universities) were 
invited to take part in the banquet (Jaffe, 2000; 
Scherer, 2007). Nororiously, the adjustment of the 
Figure 3. Higher education R&D financed by industry as % of BERD and HERD, 1981–2004 
Notes:  BERD = business expenditure on R&D 
 HERD = higher education expenditure on R&D 
Source:  Data taken from OECD (2007) 
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European patent system to the third industrial revo-
lution has been much slower than in the US where 
pragmatic attitudes adopted by the patent office and 
legal institutions have always been the rule in order 
to accommodate innovators in new fields, at the  
expense of relaxing evaluation standards for pat-
entability and hampering their rigorous implementa-
tion. A number of new subject matters are still under 
discussion in Europe (living organisms, software) 
while others are simply not considered for pat-
entability (business methods). The average cost of 
patent application and examination remains much 
higher in Europe than in the US. As a possible con-
sequence, European firms and particularly the small 
high-tech companies experience difficulties in using 
the European patent system to appropriate their in-
novative efforts and the small firms do not use the 
US system where the costs of IPR enforcement are 
dissuasive.5 
Fourthly, changes in the rules for financing new 
firms leading to customised financial solutions for 
start-ups and fast movers were an important policy 
step toward the new industrial structure (Reynolds 
and Curtin, 2008). First, the new rules allow pension 
funds to invest in venture capital (VC) firms and 
take stakes in risky companies listed on the Nasdaq 
(new pension fund regulations 1974–1979). Sec-
ondly, these rules involved the transformation of the 
Nasdaq into a stock market specialised in innovative 
firms (1980s), particularly since after the 1980s non-
profitable firms could be listed. These firms were al-
lowed to include a whole range of ‘intangibles’ in 
their financial statements, notably their patents and 
other IPRs. In this way a new ‘exit option’ was 
opened up for VC firms and an abundant supply of 
VC was generated. While US biotechnology firms 
were flooded with money in the 1980s, European 
companies could barely find financing since they 
were not listed and there was thus no easy ‘exit’ for 
venture capitalists. The EU regulation has recently 
been adapted: restrictions for listing on the London 
Stock Exchange ceased in 1995, and in 1996 the 
same thing occurred in France (Nouveau Marché). 
The lagging development of ICT firms and even bio-
technology firms in Europe is partly due to EU de-
lays (15 years) in adapting financial rules. As proof, 
and despite the internet bubble, the rate of formation 
of new companies in Europe has surged and VC  
investment in European firms has grown rapidly  
in Europe especially in the UK and France (Euro-
pean Commission, 2006), the first countries to be 
deregulated. 
Doubts concerning the efficiency  
of the new system 
The final section of this paper is devoted to a discus-
sion of the efficiency of the new R&D structures that 
have emerged following 20 years of change. The 
structural changes described above form a system of 
interdependent forces that reinforce each other and 
clearly push the structure away from the previous 
organisation, at least in a few new industries. 
The pros and cons 
In the ‘old days’ the two major players in inventive 
activities were the public research sector that pro-
duced and put basic knowledge and certain kinds of 
Figure 4. GBAORD, as % of GDP, by objectives, 1981–2005 
Source:  Data taken from OECD (2007) 
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technologies (instrumentation for example) into the 
public domain, and the large firms that used this 
knowledge to develop products. As a matter of fact, 
the large integrated firm was quite effective in solv-
ing numerous management and control problems 
usually associated with R&D investments (long-term 
risk, imperfect appropriability, complex monitoring 
issues, sunk costs, shared costs and vertically com-
plementary outcomes) (Cockburn, 2003). In the con-
text of large, vertically integrated firms, R&D 
productivity was driven by economies of scale and 
scope and the ability to capture internally and exter-
nally generated spillovers. This ability was facili-
tated by a moderate level of patenting activities, with 
firms allowing diffusion of their own knowledge in 
return for low-cost absorption of others’ knowledge, 
and a large public research domain. In this context, 
the public domain containing a stock of freely acces-
sible information was a key factor that greatly influ-
enced the efficiency of innovation processes. That 
shared collection of basic knowledge provided the 
building blocks for new inventions. 
The structural changes documented above re-
sulted in a shift from this system toward a new one: 
a much more complicated structure that is vertically 
disintegrated. There are reasons to believe that verti-
cal specialisation can bring efficiency gains (Cock-
burn, 2003): 
• Specialisation: large integrated firms minimise 
some costs but can raise others (internal bureauc-
racy, rigidity, conservatism); new firms are faster 
and more cost-effective at developing new tech-
nologies. They exhibit advantages in terms of 
specialisation, focus and high-powered incentives. 
• Market driven resource allocation: large incum-
bent firms can slow down technical progress; they 
have incentives to shelve or abandon some inno-
vation in order to avoid cannibalizing their exist-
ing products. 
• Intensified competition: supporting a market for 
R&D services and patents on upstream technolo-
gies can speed up progress in science; large inte-
grated firms have incentives to develop basic 
technologies in secret; this is socially costly be-
cause knowledge spillovers and social returns are 
lower than if basic technologies are disclosed 
through patent applications. 
Baumol (2002) has described and analysed these ef-
ficiency gains, which stem from the increasing role 
played by market relationships in inventive activi-
ties. He devotes a great deal of attention to the role 
of markets in technology dissemination. Starting 
with the right idea that dissemination is no minor 
matter for the efficiency of the economy’s growth 
process, he shows how markets for technology may 
play an effective role in that dissemination process 
under simple conditions. While economists usually 
see a conflict between (incentives to) innovation and 
dissemination (uncompensated and/or too rapid dis-
semination discourages firms from undertaking in-
novative activities that cost money and effort since 
they expect to be unable to capture a substantial 
fraction of the social return on their investments), 
Baumol claims that an efficient market for technol-
ogy will considerably alleviate this problem. 
Since dissemination through market transactions 
provides a means of obtaining a ‘sufficient reward’ 
from innovation, if the price is right, then it follows 
that it will pay the firm to permit others to use its 
technology. This will happen if the firm that wants 
to buy is a more efficient user than the owner of the 
technology.6 In such circumstances, the market will 
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succeed in partially reconciling innovation and  
dissemination. 
However, Baumol’s world is an ideal construction 
far removed from reality. It can even be said that it 
is rare to find another market with as many market 
failures. A recent survey addressed to IP officers 
working in large US corporations (Cockburn, 2007) 
illustrates the point very clearly: 
• Transactions in technological knowledge are 
complex and costly. 
• A large fraction of the total IP inventory appears 
not to be licensable. 
• More than one-third of a firm’s total IP inventory 
is rated as being unlikely to be licensed even 
though the firm is willing to transact.  
As a result, even for inventions that the owner 
wishes to license, the probability of this occurring 
remains very low (around 5%). The obstacles to li-
censing impose two major types of costs: 
• Deals not done (underuse of IP). 
• Incorrect prices: price signals in competitive mar-
kets are widely believed to induce behaviour by 
participants that results in socially optimal re-
source allocation. When prices are ‘wrong’ there 
is no such guarantee and quite poor outcomes may 
result. 
Of course, sectoral differences matter. In a few sec-
tors, these markets work relatively well and these are 
the sectors where IPR boundaries are clearly defined 
(Bessen and Meurrer, 2008). But there are many sec-
tors where this is not the case, and surprisingly many 
high-tech sectors (i.e. where structural changes are 
significantly altering the organisation of the innova-
tion process) are characterised by inefficient markets 
for technologies, particularly in cases where vertical 
disintegration gives rise to new specialised segments 
which are positioned very upstream (Cockburn, 
2002, 2003, and 2005 for the cases of business 
methods, biotechnology, bio-informatics; Lemley, 
2005 for nanotechnologies). 
In conclusion, we argue that markets for tech-
nologies are generally much more inefficient than 
most other markets. The fact that the structural 
changes described above lead to the centrality of this 
mechanism for the governance of R&D and the in-
novation process is a matter of concern.  
Policy implications 
The structural changes are leading to a system that is 
still confronted by problems with inefficiency and 
policy responses are important for anyone who takes 
what has been described in this paper seriously. We 
need to distinguish between two categories of policy 
responses. 
The first policy response concerns Europe (Foray 
and Van Ark, 2008). In Europe, experts and policy-
makers have not understood the magnitude and 
centrality of the structural changes in corporate 
R&D occurring in the US during the last 25 years 
and at a more modest pace in Europe and that we 
have summarised, following Mowery, with the no-
tion of a greater reliance on market relationships 
for the governance of R&D and innovative activi-
ties. Clearly, we have observed a co-evolution of 
the corporate R&D structures and the institutional 
framework in the US, but not in Europe. There is 
therefore a need for institutional adjustments so 
that our institutions better match the new structures 
and organisation of innovative activities in the 
emerging fields.  
We need the proper institutions for an effective 
development of this economy of vertical specialisa-
tion, start-ups, fast movers and new industries. In-
stitutions in continental Europe are rather weak at 
promoting economic dynamism, in terms of entre-
preneurship and the ability of financial markets to 
steer finance towards worthy innovations. In fact, 
they tend to be good at suppressing this dynamism. 
Therefore the relatively poor economic perform-
ance of Europe results in both the underdevelop-
ment of capitalist institutions like VC and equity 
finance, and the overdevelopment of corporatist in-
stitutions which suppress innovation and competi-
tion. These corporatist institutions impose penalties, 
impediments, prohibitions and mandates generally 
intended to damp down ‘creative destruction’. 
There is, therefore, a case for continental Europe to 
create a new balance between capitalist institutions 
and corporatist institutions. Facilitating entry into 
business, creating tailored financing solutions for 
emerging firms (Phillipon and Véron, 2008) as well 
as radically transforming the governance and mode 
of operation of the university system are policy ac-
tions of particular relevance for Europe that are 
amply discussed and supported in many reports 
(Aghion, 2006; Aghion et al, 2007; Philippon and 
Véron, 2008; van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 
2008). 
The second category of policy response to these 
structural changes is more general in nature (in the 
sense of relevant for any advanced economy), and 
this concerns fixing markets for technology. Indeed 
we have just discussed their relative inefficiencies, 
whereas the structural changes described above have 
placed them in an eminent position as coordinators 
of R&D and innovative activities. Such a policy di-
rection involves (Cockburn, 2007): 
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• mitigating information problems by increasing 
transparency through better public reporting of IP 
transactions, providing more extensive and regu-
lar data on trade in technology, reforming finan-
cial accounting standards which govern the 
valuation of intangibles; 
• promoting standardised contracts and market 
norms; 
• developing market infrastructures (low-cost dis-
pute resolution mechanisms, insurance against 
certain risks); and 
• of course, reforming the patent system to increase 
patent quality. 
Resolving market failures should be an important 
objective in the case of markets for technology if we 
take the argument about the centrality of market 
transactions in the governance of innovation and 
R&D processes seriously. 
Notes 
1.  Most of the data used to document these changes in the US 
were obtained from National Science Foundation reports. 
2. These correspond to the 73-74 NACE codes (Eurostat, 2002). 
3.  Few statistics are available on licensing transactions. How-
ever, the surge of cross-border royalties since the 1990s sug-
gests their growing importance (Guellec, 2008). 
4.  The EUKLEMS database also underlines that the value added 
in business services grows faster in the US. Certain reclassifi-
cations regularly made at country level (see Shackelford, 
2007) should not modify the conclusion. It can, however, also 
be argued that in Europe a larger share of R&D services are 
provided by non-profit organisations and are thus not included 
in the usual KIBS or R&D service statistics based on for-profit 
business surveys. 
5.  Citing a 2003 survey, Hoti and McAleer (2006) say that the 
average costs of patent and trademark litigation in the US are, 
respectively, US$2 million and US$600,000. 
6.  The superior efficiency of the buyer means that it can earn 
more from its use than the technology owner can. So the 
buyer can still earn a profit even if it pays a licence fee some-
what greater than the amount the owner would be able to earn 
by using the technology itself. Under such conditions, the 
seller is better off licensing the technology, and the buyer is 
better off buying and using it. 
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